Abstract. This paper studies the role of memory and communication in overlapping generations (OLG) games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. An individual has no prior memory -that is, he does not directly witness the events that occur before his tenure. Instead, each individual relies on information about the past from his predecessor via cheap talk. This paper highlights the role of communication as a surrogate for memory.
Introduction
Societies and organizations are ongoing concerns. They may continue on as long as they are politically or financially viable. Hence, relationships between societies or between organizations are also ongoing. In stationary environments, these relationships may resemble infinitely repeated games. In such games, "cooperative" outcomes that are mutually superior to one shot play are attainable if the players are patient enough.
However, games between societies or between organizations are not games between individuals. Though they may "live on" indefinitely, societies and organizations are managed by individuals with shorter and finite tenures. These games therefore have a dynastic bent. Individuals within any one "dynastic organizations" enter, play the game, and are eventually replaced. If the entry times of individuals happen to be sequenced across organizations, then the game is played between overlapping generations of individuals.
Such situations are clearly distinct from standard, infinitely repeated games. Nevertheless, Salant (1991) , Kandori (1992) , and Smith (1992) have all proved various versions of the Folk Theorem for overlapping generations games. The most common statement of this result is that any individually rational payoff of the game is approximated to an arbitrary degree by a subgame perfect equilibrium when (1) individuals are patient and live long enough, and (2) the length of overlap between individual's lives is long enough.
The Folk Theorem serves as a useful benchmark and point of departure for the present paper. In particular, the common assumption in most of the literature is that the history of play is either perfectly observed or is costlessly verified by all the players. However, because organizations "outlive" the tenure of any individual member, no person in an organization can directly witness events which occurred before he arrives. That is, almost by definition, each person's direct memory is necessarily limited to his own experiences.
The lack of direct memory has important strategic consequences if the past cannot be communicated accurately. Consider, for example, how a firm's manager might react to a rival's price fixing proposal, knowing that his reaction will not be observed by the incoming manager of the rival firm. Alternatively, consider how the leader of one political party would react to a proposed power-sharing arrangement if the proposal made by the outgoing leader of the rival party will not be credibly conveyed to the incoming leader. In other words, indirect memory through communication is critical for cooperation or collusion in these contexts.
Consequently, this paper studies the role of communication as a surrogate for memory in repeated games between organizations. In particular, we examine a special case of an overlapping generations environment with two "organizations". Each organization is characterized by a succession of managers, each of whom remains in the organization for some fixed length, T , then exits, only to be replaced by a successor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities.
